Q1: Major Ralph Bagnold was able to convince British army commanders that
1) their soldiers were having limited success on missions in the desert because they were not being supplied with the right resources.
2) the airplanes being used to fly over enemy territory and make observations in the desert were in need of major improvements.
3) he could lead a unit of men on missions in the desert despite the fact that he had little experience in such an environment.
4) using a ground-based unit to gather information about enemy activities in the desert would be an effective strategy.
During World War II, the British fought against Germany and Italy in the deserts of North Africa. Desert warfare was characterized by small battles between troops that were widely spread out, and there was a need to move quickly and at night to avoid both detection and the dangerous daytime heat. The area’s vast size and sandy terrain made transporting supplies difficult, and the lack of water severely limited operations.
However, for one British army officer, Major Ralph Bagnold, these harsh conditions presented a strategic opportunity. Having spent years exploring the North African desert before the war, Bagnold knew the terrain well, and he was convinced that a small, highly mobile motorized unit that could observe and track enemy forces would be invaluable. At first, British commanders rejected his proposal to form such a unit, believing airplanes were better suited for such long-range intelligence gathering. Bagnold insisted, however, that gathering information on the ground would be advantageous, and his persistence led to the formation of the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), with Bagnold as commander, in June 1940.